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Most theories of motivation have highlighted that human behav-
ior is guided by the hedonic principle, according to which our
choices of daily activities aim to minimize negative affect and
maximize positive affect. However, it is not clear how to reconcile
this idea with the fact that people routinely engage in unpleasant
yet necessary activities. To address this issue, we monitored in real
time the activities and moods of over 28,000 people across an
average of 27 d using a multiplatform smartphone application. We
found that people’s choices of activities followed a hedonic flexi-
bility principle. Specifically, people were more likely to engage in
mood-increasing activities (e.g., play sports) when they felt bad,
and to engage in useful but mood-decreasing activities (e.g.,
housework) when they felt good. These findings clarify how he-
donic considerations shape human behavior. They may explain
how humans overcome the allure of short-term gains in happiness
to maximize long-term welfare.
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What will you be doing in an hour? Working? Doing yourlaundry? Having a beer with a friend? Behind this simple
question lies one of the most important decisions we face in our
lives, namely, how to spend our time. On average, people live
about 600,000 h, and whether we decide to spend a greater or
lesser number of these hours working, sleeping, socializing, or
watching television has crucial consequences for our mental and
physical health (1–3).
There are many factors that influence our everyday activities—
from financial considerations to social norms to political constraints—
yet most theories of motivation have highlighted the crucial role
played by negative and positive affective states (4–6). In particular,
human behavior is believed to be guided by the hedonic principle,
according to which our choices of activities aim to minimize neg-
ative affect and maximize positive affect (7).
The hedonic principle has been tested empirically through
laboratory studies that have used a wide variety of mood in-
duction techniques (e.g., writing about negative or positive life
events, watching sad or happy movies) and then asked individuals
to choose among various activities. Results have largely supported
the hedonic principle: when they feel bad, most people try to
decrease their negative emotions by choosing to engage in activ-
ities that make them feel better (e.g., eating comfort food, seeking
social support) (8–12); when they feel good, most people try to
maintain or even maximize their positive emotions (e.g., playing,
engaging in various social, physical, and leisure activities) (13–15)—
at least when positive emotions are not considered inappropriate
due to social norms or utilitarian concerns (16–18).
Do these laboratory findings generalize to our everyday deci-
sions? Although widely supported in the laboratory, the hedonic
principle, without further specification, does not explain much of
people’s everyday behavior: if we always try to improve our
moods, when are we motivated to do the dishes, wait in line at
the post office, or even go to work?
One possibility is that our choice of activities is mostly deter-
mined by the demands and constraints of everyday life. In the face
of these constraints, the “hedonic opportunism hypothesis” sug-
gests that we try to maximize our mood whenever an opportunity
arises. A second possibility is that the hedonic principle applies
mainly when people’s affective states are salient (19). According to
this “hedonic salience hypothesis,” we are concerned with maxi-
mizing our mood when we feel very bad or very good, and we
undertake less pleasurable—yet necessary—activities when we are
in a more neutral affective state. A third possibility—suggested by
Herbert Simon (20) half a century ago—is that people have mul-
tiple simultaneous goals, from seeking short-term rewards (e.g.,
increasing one’s mood state) to pursuing longer-term rewards (e.g.,
working hard toward a promotion), and affective states help to
prioritize among these goals. According to this “hedonic flexibility
hypothesis,” whereas negative affect may drive people to seek so-
lace in short-term rewards, positive affect should lead people to
shift their priorities toward less pleasant activities that might be
important for their longer-term goals (21).
These three hypotheses make different predictions regarding
how mood should be related to people’s subsequent choices of
activities. The hedonic opportunism hypothesis suggests that
mood should not predict the type of activities that people engage
in. The hedonic salience hypothesis suggests that extreme mood
states should predict a higher propensity to engage in pleasant
activities, whereas neutral mood states should predict a higher
propensity to engage in useful but unpleasant activities. Finally,
the hedonic flexibility hypothesis suggests that negative mood
states should predict a higher propensity to engage in pleasant
activities, whereas positive mood states should predict a higher
propensity to engage in useful but unpleasant activities.
To test which specification of the hedonic principle is best able
to explain choices of everyday activities, we conducted a large
experience-sampling study, monitoring in real time the activities
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and moods of over 60,000 people across an average of 27 d using
a multiplatform smartphone application (www.58sec.com), to-
taling over half a million samples. Participants were presented
with questionnaires at random times throughout the day and
asked to rate their current mood on a scale from 0 (very un-
happy) to 100 (very happy) and to report what they were doing
from a standard list of 25 non-mutually exclusive choices (1).
Using a Bayesian regression model and selecting participants
who answered two consecutive questionnaires or more within a
range of 12 h (Nparticipants = 28,212; Mage = 28.1, SDage = 9.0; 66%
women; Nquestionnaires = 245,006), we examined simultaneously
how people’s current mood (mood t) related to the type of activity
they would be engaging in a few hours later (activity t+ 1) and the
relationship between that activity and their subsequent mood
(mood t+ 1), controlling for what people were previously doing
(activity t), time of the day, day of the week, and amount of time
elapsed between the two measurement times. This approach
allowed us to compute whether one’s current mood changes the
odds of subsequently engaging in each of the 25 activities (i.e., what
people decide to do) and how engaging in each of the 25 activities
changes one’s future mood (i.e., how people feel as a result).
Results
The results of our analyses are depicted in Fig. 1, and they reveal
two key findings. First, people’s daily decisions to engage in one
activity rather than another are related to how they currently
feel: participants’ mood at time t significantly predicted what
they would be doing at time t+ 1 for 15 out of 25 activities
(posterior probability <0.005; color bars in Fig. 1A), a finding
that is inconsistent with the hedonic opportunism hypothesis.
The effects of mood on people’s choice of activities were stronger for
pleasant than unpleasant activities. As depicted in Fig. 1 C and D,
although mood at time t significantly predicted people’s propensity
to engage in five unpleasant activities at time t+ 1 (i.e., commuting,
working, housework, sleeping, and waiting), these activities were
more strongly predicted by the day of the week or the time of the day
(as measured by the proportion of deviance explained by each de-
gree of freedom of the corresponding variable). In contrast, of the 10
pleasant activities significantly predicted by mood at time t, two ac-
tivities (i.e., eating and childcare) were better predicted by mood
than by the day of the week, three activities (i.e., nature, leisure, and
culture) were better predicted by mood than by the time of the day,
and three activities (i.e., sport, chatting, and drinking) were better
predicted by mood than by either day or time. In other words, if you
wanted to predict how likely a random stranger whom you meet is to
be working, cleaning the dishes, or sleeping a few hours from now,
knowing what day or time it is would be more informative than
knowing her current mood. If, however, you wanted to predict how
likely that person is to exercise, chat with friends, or have a drink in
the next few hours, knowing her current mood would give you more
information than knowing that it is Saturday or that it is 7:00 PM.
Second, the interplay between mood and choices of activity
followed a very specific pattern. In line with both the hedonic
salience and hedonic flexibility hypotheses, when participants were
in a bad mood, they were more likely to engage in activities that
tended to subsequently boost their mood. For instance, if people’s
current mood decreased by 10 points, they were more likely to
later engage in doing sport [adjusted odds ratio (ORadj) = 1.129],
going out into nature (ORadj = 1.092), leisure (ORadj = 1.074),
chatting (ORadj = 1.068), cultural activities (ORadj = 1.065),
drinking (ORadj = 1.046), playing (ORadj = 1.044), eating (ORadj =
1.029), or taking care of children (ORadj = 1.021), and all of these
activities were in turn associated with a subsequent increase in
mood (Fig. 1B, red bars). Contrary to the hedonic salience hy-
pothesis, however, and consistent with the hedonic flexibility hy-
pothesis, when people were in a good mood, they were more likely
to engage in activities that tended to subsequently dampen their
mood. Specifically, if people’s current mood increased by 10
points, they were more likely to later engage in doing housework
(ORadj = 1.036), commuting (ORadj = 1.037), resting (ORadj =
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Fig. 1. The association between daily mood and choice of activities follows a hedonic flexibility principle. (A) Relationship between people’s current mood (mood t)
on their subsequent choice of activities (activity t + 1). (B) Relationship between people’s choice of activities (activity t + 1) on their subsequent mood (difference
betweenmood t andmood t + 1). The red and blue (vs. gray) bars depict statistically significant relationships with a posterior probability <0.005. (C) Proportion of the
deviance of choice of activities (activity t + 1) explained by people’s current mood (mood t) relative to the deviance explained by the day of the week. (D) Proportion
of the deviance of choice of activities (activity t + 1) explained by people’s current mood (mood t) relative to the deviance explained by the time of the day.
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1.038), working (ORadj = 1.051), or queuing (ORadj = 1.057), and
all of these activities were in turn associated with a subsequent
decrease in mood (Fig. 1B, blue bars). Our pattern was robust
and replicated in 10 random splits of the sample. To illustrate
these ORs and the magnitude of the hedonic flexibility principle
with a concrete example, imagine an average individual deciding
what to do on a Sunday afternoon. If that person was particularly
unhappy in the morning (scoring 10 on the mood scale), she
would be twice as likely (4.32% vs. 2.08%) to go for a walk in
nature in the afternoon than if she was particularly happy that
morning (scoring 90 on the mood scale). Likewise, if that person
was particularly happy in the morning, she would be about 30%
more likely (5.64% vs. 4.43%) to clean up her apartment in the
afternoon than if she was particularly unhappy that morning.
Our findings suggest that mood shapes the decisions people
make about which activities to undertake in the next few hours
and that, in turn, these activities influence how they feel. How-
ever, two alternative explanations of the interplay we observed
between activities and mood are possible. The first is that the
succession of activities in everyday life might follow a systematic
pattern or “rhythm” (e.g., people typically eat breakfast then go
to work rather than the other way around). The second is that
mood might follow a natural rhythm [e.g., people typically feel in
a better mood in the morning than just before lunch (22)].
If activities followed a natural rhythm that was not affected by
mood but caused corresponding changes in moods (e.g., eating
breakfast makes people happy, working makes people unhappy,
and people typically eat breakfast before going to work), then
one might expect to observe similar associations between mood
and activities as the ones we observed, even if mood actually
does not cause any change in people’s choice of activities. In that
case, mood at time t would not be a valuable predictor of activity
at time t+ 1. To rule out this alternative explanation, we computed,
for each activity, the Akaike information criterion (AIC) of a model
in which mood at time t was removed from the set of independent
variables. These analyses revealed that our findings could not be
explained by the natural rhythm of activities (P< 0.004).
If mood follows a natural rhythm that is not affected by the
activities that people are currently doing but causes corresponding
changes in choices of subsequent activities (e.g., people are hap-
pier at 8:00 AM than at 11:00 AM, and being happy in the early
morning increases the odds they work a few hours later), one
might expect to observe similar associations between mood and
activities as the ones we observed, even if the choice of activity
actually did not cause changes in people’s mood. In that case, the
change in mood between times t and t+ 1 would solely be predicted
by current mood and not by activities at t + 1. To rule out this
alternative explanation, we compared the AIC of two models
predicting the change in mood (ΔM =Mt+1 −Mt) from either
current mood alone or current mood and activities at time t+ 1.
This analysis revealed that our finding could not be explained by
the natural rhythm of mood (P< 0.0001). Taken together, these
findings offer further support for the hedonic flexibility hypothesis.
Discussion
Deciding what to do with one’s time is one of the most funda-
mental choices humans face every day—a choice that has crucial
consequences both for individuals and society at large. Our
findings demonstrate that people’s everyday decisions regarding
which activities to undertake are directly linked to how they feel
and follow a remarkably consistent pattern. People seek mood-
enhancing activities when they feel bad and engage in unpleasant
activities that might promise longer-term payoff when they feel
good. Although our data cannot directly tell us whether regularly
engaging in unpleasant activities predicts psychological and
social adjustment 5 or 10 y down the line, a large body of work
has consistently demonstrated the importance of sleeping (23),
employment (24), and living in a reasonably clean and organized
home (25, 26) on mental and physical health.
The present research shows robust associations between affective
states and choices of activity: people’s current mood meaningfully
changes (sometimes doubling or tripling) the probability they later
engage in certain types of activity, and mood sometimes predicts
what people will be doing in the next few hours better than knowing
what day or time it is. However, it is important to note that, owing to
the study design, our examination of the effect of mood on choice of
daily activities was limited to a standard subset of assessed activities.
Future research should examine the pervasiveness of the hedonic
flexibility principle with a wider range of activities (e.g., via open-
ended responses). In addition, further work is needed to examine the
underlying mechanism through which affective states relate to
choices of activities. For instance, it is possible that indirect effects,
such as the impact of mood on people’s concentration or fatigue
levels, influence the relationship that we observed. Likewise, the
present work has focused on the relationship between mood and
people’s choices on average. However, it is very likely that important
individual differences exist in the extent to which affective consid-
erations guide people’s daily choices. Investigating the hedonic
flexibility principle across various groups of individuals and cultures
represents an exciting avenue for future work. Finally, experimental
research is needed to establish the causal impact of affective states
on daily decisions. One could, for example, manipulate mood by
sending positive or negative stimuli on people’s phone and mea-
suring how this impacts their subsequent choices of activity.
Opportunities to indulge in short-term pleasure are all around
us—from our favorite hobbies to our favorite ice cream. Our
personal well-being and survival potential as a species might
crucially depend on our ability to overcome the allure of short-
term happiness gains to maximize long-term welfare. The he-
donic flexibility principle may explain how humans have and
continue to overcome such trade-offs in their everyday life.
Materials and Methods
Participants and Experience Sampling. Participants volunteered for the study
by downloading 58 seconds (www.58sec.com), a free francophone mobile
application for iPhone and Android phones dedicated to measuring various
aspects of users’ well-being through short questionnaires presented at ran-
dom times throughout the day. The project received significant media cov-
erage in France. At initial signup, participants answered several questions
about themselves, including age, gender, and country of residence (see
Table S1 for detailed information on the composition of the sample). Next,
participants were asked which days of the week and within what time
windows they wished to receive questionnaire requests (default = 7 d/wk
from 9:00 AM to 10:00 PM). Participants could also customize the number of
daily questionnaire requests they wanted to receive (default = 4, minimum =
1, maximum = 12). The application algorithm then divided each participant’s
day into a number of intervals equal to the number of samples to be
requested, and a random time was chosen within each interval. The minimum
time between two questionnaires was set to 1 h to avoid large artifactual
autocorrelations between answers to the same question in consecutive tests.
The random sampling was ensured through a notification system that did not
require users to be connected to the Internet. New random times were gen-
erated each day, and the times were independently randomized for each
participant. At each of these times, participants received a notification on their
mobile phone informing them that a new questionnaire was available (Fig.
S1A). They then had the possibility to take the questionnaire, snooze it (i.e.,
delay it by 9 min), or reject it (Fig. S1B). The two questions asked to partici-
pants were “How do you currently feel?” (Fig. S1C) and “What are you cur-
rently doing?” and were always presented in that order (i.e., mood then
activity). The frequency of recorded results as a function of time and day is
reported in Fig. S2. In the present paper, we refer to activities that are asso-
ciated with positive changes in mood (compared with the previous mood level)
as pleasant activities and activities that are associated with negative changes in
mood as unpleasant activities.
This study has been approved in written form as part of a broader project
on emotions in everyday life by The Ethics Committee of the University of
Groningen, TheNetherlands. The studymethodwas carried out in accordance
with the approved guidelines. All study protocols were approved by the
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aforementioned committee. At initial sign-up, participants provided their
written informed consent.
Regression Model. To assess whether people’s current mood impacts their
decision to later engage in an activity, we related these variables in a re-
gression model. Because current and future moods are likely to be corre-
lated and because future mood is also likely to be correlated to future
activities, we incorporated future mood as a covariate in the regression
model. This guarantees that associations between current mood and future
activities are not merely mediated by future mood. Specifically, we let Mt
and Mt+1 denote the mood at time t and t + 1, respectively, and we let A
j
t
and Ajt + 1 be dichotomous variables denoting whether the participant was
engaged in the jth activity (j = 1,. . ., 25) at time t and t + 1, respectively. If
Ajt = 1, then the participant is engaged in the jth activity at time t, whereas
the opposite is true if Ajt = 0. Using a logistic regression, we can link Mt and
Mt+1 to the probability PðAjt +1Þ that participants engage in the jth activity.
The generic regression model has the following expression:
logit  P

Ajt+1

= βj0 + β
j
cMt + β
j
fMt+1 +
XK
k=1
βjkXk ,
where βj0 is the intercept, β
j
c is the coefficient related to the current mood,
and βjf is the coefficient related to the future mood. The terms in Xk are a set
of possible covariates that need to be controlled for. We consider the fol-
lowing covariates: the day of week (e.g., people are more likely to be working
on a weekday than during the weekend), the time of day (e.g., people are
more likely to be eating at noon than at 10:30 AM), and latency effects (e.g.,
some activities span a period that is longer than the time between two
measurements). Preferences based on the day are expressed by adding a
categorical variable D specifying whether the day of the measurement is a
weekday, a Saturday, or a Sunday. Because no prior functional variation (e.g.,
linear or quadratic) of the activity with respect to the time of day can rea-
sonably be expressed, we represent the time of day as a categorical variable H
by binning the time in 12 periods of 2 h (from 0:00 AM–1:59:59 AM to 10:00
PM–11:59:59 PM). Finally, the latency effect can be represented by adding the
dichotomous variable Ajt indicating whether one was already engaged in the
jth activity at the previous measurement.
Selecting which predictors are relevant is a model selection problem and
the AIC is a widely used and efficient method to achieve model selection (27).
This criterion is as follows: AIC= 2N− log L, where N is the number of pa-
rameters of the model and L is the maximum value of the model likelihood
(i.e., its likelihood after the coefficients of the model have been optimized).
By trading off between the goodness of fit of the model (−log L) and its
complexity, AIC measures the relative qualities of different models. Lower
AIC indicate better-suited models. In order for more complex models to be
selected, the increase in their log-likelihood term must outweigh the cost
associated with additional parameters. We investigated the following six
models (1–6) and computed their AIC for each of the 25 activities:
logitP

Ajt+1

= βj0, [1]
logitP

Ajt+1

= βj0 + β
j
fMt+1 + β
j
hH+ β
j
dD+ β
j
aA
j
t , [2]
logitP

Ajt+1

= βj0 + β
j
cMt + β
j
fMt+1, [3]
logitP

Ajt+1

= βj0 + β
j
cMt + β
j
fMt+1
+ βjhH+ β
j
dD+ β
j
aA
j
t ,
[4]
logitP

Ajt+1

= βj0 +

βjc + α
j
c
1
Δt

Mt + β
j
fMt+1 + β
j
hH
+ βjdD+

βja + α
j
a
1
Δt

Ajt ,
[5]
logitP

Ajt+1

= βj0 +

βjc + α
j
c
1
Δt

Mt + β
j
fMt+1 + β
j
hH
+ βjdD+
X25
k=1

βka + α
k
a
1
Δt

Akt .
[6]
Model 1 is the null baseline model that has no predictor. Model 2 assumes
that current mood has no effect on the decision to later engage in an ac-
tivity. Model 3 assumes that no covariates are required to express the rela-
tion between mood and the decision to engage in activities. Models 4 and 5
include all covariates described above. Model 5 includes additional interac-
tion terms to express the influence of the actual time elapsed between two
reports (Δt). This model is based on the assumption that, if current mood has
an effect on the decision to later engage in an activity, then this effect must
be stronger if the actual time difference between two measurements, Δt, is
smaller. The same applies to the latency effect. Finally, model 6 includes the
dichotomous variables of all of the previous activities at time t and not just
the jth activity.
The resulting AIC (computed using the aic function from R, version 3.1.0)
for all activities and all models are summarized in Table S2. For readability
purposes, we normalized each AIC by the maximum AIC among all models.
This does not alter our conclusions because we are only interested in the
identity of the model that leads to the smallest AIC. Model 6 is the most
appropriate model for all 25 activities. Consequently, we used model 6
throughout our analyses.
Statistical Analyses. To assess whether people’s current mood significantly
predicts their future decision to engage in an activity, we computed the
probability that the coefficient βjc in model 6 is larger than 0 for all 25 ac-
tivities. If that probability is very large (i.e., close to 1), then an increase in
current mood is almost certainly associated with an increase in the odds to
engage in the jth activity. Conversely, if this probability is very small (i.e.,
close to zero), then a decrease in current mood almost certainly leads to an
increase in the odds to engage in the jth activity. If the current mood does
not reliably predict the odds to engage in the jth activity, then this proba-
bility ought to be around 0.5, reflecting our ignorance of changes in future
odds beyond chance level (50%). This posterior probability is estimated in a
Bayesian approach and can be interpreted as the Bayesian equivalent of
conventional P values, which assess whether the coefficients are significantly
different from zero. Specifically, we estimated the parameters of model 6
using the inference method implemented as the bayesglm function from the
arm package (28) (version 1.7-05) in R (version 3.1.0), using the default pa-
rameters. This function returns estimates for the posterior mean (μ) and SE
(σ) of βjc. Assuming that the posterior distribution of β
j
c can be approximated
by a Gaussian distribution, we computed the probability that βjc > 0 as
follows:
P

βjc >0

= 0.5+ 0.5erf
 
zjcﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
!
,   where  zjc =
μ
σ
.
Activities are deemed to be significantly predicted by the current mood if the
probability Pðβjc > 0Þ is either larger than 1− 10−4 (blue bars on Fig. 1) or
lower than 10−4 (red bars on Fig. 1). In the former case, the reported pos-
terior probability (<10−4) is taken as 1− Pðβjc > 0Þ, so that small probabilities
always indicate that the decision to engage in activities was significantly
predicted by the current mood (similarly to small P values indicating a co-
efficient that is significantly different from zero).
The coefficients βjc were reported as adjusted ORs expressing the impact
of an increase/decrease in current mood on the probability to later engage
in a particular activity. These adjusted ORs were reported for a difference
arbitrarily set to 10 points in current mood (ΔMt = 10) and were calculated as
follows: ORjadj = e
βjcΔMt . Fig. 1A represents the ORadj for each activity.
To assess the association between activities and changes in mood, we
computed, for each activity, themean difference between future and current
moods. In other words, for each activity j, we computed the average dif-
ference in mood ΔMj =Mt+1 −Mt for all entries presenting with A
j
t + 1 = 1.
Note that ΔMj should not be confused with ΔMt used above. ΔMj represents
an observed change in mood between time t and time t +1 when the par-
ticipant is engaged in the jth activity at time t +1, whereas ΔMt represents
some difference in mood at time t that is arbitrarily fixed to some value
(fixed to 10 for the visualization in Fig. 1A) to observe the impact that such a
difference in mood would have on the subsequent likelihood to engage in
an activity.
We analyzed the proportion of explained deviance (equivalent to the
proportion of variance for generalized linear models) using the function
anova in R. We compared the proportion of deviance explained by the mood
at time t to that explained by the day of the week and the time of the day.
Because the day of the week adds 2 degrees of freedom to the model and is
therefore more likely to explain more deviance due to chance alone, we
report it as the proportion of explained deviance per degree of freedom by
dividing its explained deviance by 2, and similarly for the time of day, which
has 11 degrees of freedom.
Interpretation of ORs. In Results, we provided an example of the impact of
current mood on an average participant’s likelihood to later either go out to
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nature or to do housework. The result of this example can be obtained as
follows. The OR of engaging in a particular activity is given by the product of
adjusted ORs for all independent variables (current activities, current mood,
time of day, etc.) as described by logistic regressions. All other factors being
equal, the impact of a difference in current mood on the OR to later engage
in a specific activity amounts to multiplying the average OR of that activity
by the adjusted OR eβ
j
cΔMt . The frequency of times that participants in our
study went out in nature on a Sunday between 2:00 PM and 3:00 PM was
3%, and the frequency of times that they did housework at that time was
5%. The corresponding baseline OR [OR= P=ð1−PÞ] were 0.0309 and 0.0526,
respectively. Assuming a baseline mood of 50, the OR for an individual
scoring 90 on the mood scale is simply obtained by multiplying the baseline
OR by eβ
j
c×40 and that for an individual scoring 10 on the mood scale is simply
obtained by multiplying the baseline OR by e−β
j
c×40. Using the value of βjc
corresponding to nature and housework, we obtain the ORs for going out in
nature as follows:
OR= 0.0309× 0.6856= 0.0212  for  ΔMt = 40,   and
OR= 0.0309× 1.4585= 0.0451  for  ΔMt =−40,
and those ORs for doing housework as follows:
OR= 0.0526× 1.1352= 0.0597  for  ΔMt = 40,   and
OR=0.0526× 0.8809= 0.0464  for  ΔMt =−40.
These ORs can be transformed back to the probability of engaging in these
activities by using the inverse formula for ORs: P =OR=ð1+ORÞ.
Robustness Analyses. To test the robustness of our results, we randomly split
the dataset in 10 subsets, each containing the data from 2,822 subjects except
for the 10th subset containing the data from 2,814 subjects.We estimated the
parameters of model 6 in each of these subsets independently. Results were
found to be virtually identical across the 10 samples.
Ruling Out Explanations by Natural Rhythms. To rule out the alternative ex-
planation that the rhythm of activities in everyday life might account for our
findings, we computed, for each activity, the AIC of the following model 7
(which is similar to our original model 6 except that mood at time t was
removed from the set of independent variables):
logitP

Ajt+1

= βj0 + β
j
fMt+1 + β
j
hH
+ βjdD+
X25
k=1

βka + α
k
a
1
Δt

Akt .
[7]
These analyses revealed that the AIC of model 7 was higher than that of
model 6 for 20 of 25 activities, which under the null hypothesis that both
models are equivalently good would occur less than once in 250 times (two-
tailed binomial test: P < 0.004). Furthermore, the five activities for which
model 7 had a lower AIC than model 6 were those for which mood at time t
did not significantly predict activity at time t + 1 so that, in these cases, mood
had low predictive value. These results cast doubts on the hypothesis that
natural rhythm of activities could explain our pattern of results. All AIC for
models 7 can be found in Table S3.
To rule out the alternative explanation that the rhythm of mood in ev-
eryday life might account for our findings, we computed the AIC for the
following two models:
ΔM= β0 +Mt , [8]
ΔM= β0 +Mt +
X25
j=1
βjmA
j
t+1. [9]
This analysis revealed that the AIC of model 9was lower than that of model 8
by over 4,000 points, which rejects the null hypothesis that model 8 is as
good or better than model 9 in terms of information loss (P < 0.0001). These
results cast doubts on the hypothesis that natural rhythm of mood could
explain our pattern of results.
1. Kahneman D, Krueger AB, Schkade DA, Schwarz N, Stone AA (2004) A survey method
for characterizing daily life experience: The day reconstruction method. Science
306(5702):1776–1780.
2. Hawkley LC, Burleson MH, Berntson GG, Cacioppo JT (2003) Loneliness in everyday
life: Cardiovascular activity, psychosocial context, and health behaviors. J Pers Soc
Psychol 85(1):105–120.
3. Killingsworth MA, Gilbert DT (2010) A wandering mind is an unhappy mind. Science
330(6006):932.
4. Higgins ET (1997) Beyond pleasure and pain. Am Psychol 52(12):1280–1300.
5. Freud S (1920) Beyond the Pleasure Principle (Hogarth, London), Standard Ed.
6. Bentham J (1879) An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation
(Clarendon, Oxford).
7. Schacter DL, Gilbert DT, Wegner DM (2011) Psychology (Worth Publishers, New York),
2nd Ed.
8. Morris WN, Reilly NP (1987) Toward the self-regulation of mood: Theory and research.
Motiv Emot 11(3):215–249.
9. Parkinson B, Totterdell P (1999) Classifying affect-regulation strategies. Cogn Emotion
13(3):277–303.
10. Saavedra R, Earley PC (1991) Choice of task and goal under conditions of general and
specific affective inducement. Motiv Emot 15(1):45–65.
11. Thayer RE, Newman JR, McClain TM (1994) Self-regulation of mood: Strategies for
changing a bad mood, raising energy, and reducing tension. J Pers Soc Psychol 67(5):
910–925.
12. Tice DM, Bratslavsky E, Baumeister RF (2001) Emotional distress regulation takes
precedence over impulse control: If you feel bad, do it! J Pers Soc Psychol 80(1):53–67.
13. Forest D, Clark MS, Mills J, Isen AM (1979) Helping as a function of feeling state and
nature of the helping behavior. Motiv Emot 3(2):161–169.
14. Isen AM, Simmonds SF (1978) The effect of feeling good on a helping task that is
incompatible with good mood. Soc Psychol 41(4):346–349.
15. Wegener DT, Petty RE (1994) Mood management across affective states: The hedonic
contingency hypothesis. J Pers Soc Psychol 66(6):1034–1048.
16. Erber R, Wegner DM, Therriault N (1996) On being cool and collected: Mood regu-
lation in anticipation of social interaction. J Pers Soc Psychol 70(4):757–766.
17. Parrott WG (1993) Beyond hedonism: Motives for inhibiting good moods and for
maintaining bad moods. Handbook of Mental Control (Prentice-Hall, Englewood
Cliffs, NJ), pp 278–305.
18. Tamir M (2009) What do people want to feel and why? Pleasure and utility in emo-
tion regulation. Curr Dir Psychol Sci 18(2):101–105.
19. Gendolla GH (2000) On the impact of mood on behavior: An integrative theory and a
review. Rev Gen Psychol 4(4):378–408.
20. Simon HA (1967) Motivational and emotional controls of cognition. Psychol Rev 74(1):
29–39.
21. Carver CS, Scheier MF (2013) Goals and emotion. Handbook of Cognition and
Emotion (Guilford, New York), pp 176–194.
22. Golder SA, Macy MW (2011) Diurnal and seasonal mood vary with work, sleep, and
daylength across diverse cultures. Science 333(6051):1878–1881.
23. Cappuccio FP, Cooper D, D’Elia L, Strazzullo P, Miller MA (2011) Sleep duration pre-
dicts cardiovascular outcomes: A systematic review and meta-analysis of prospective
studies. Eur Heart J 32(12):1484–1492.
24. McKee-Ryan F, Song Z, Wanberg CR, Kinicki AJ (2005) Psychological and physical well-
being during unemployment: A meta-analytic study. J Appl Psychol 90(1):53–76.
25. Graham LT, Gosling SD, Travis CK (2015) The psychology of home environments: A call
for research on residential space. Perspect Psychol Sci 10(3):346–356.
26. Saxbe DE, Repetti R (2010) No place like home: Home tours correlate with daily
patterns of mood and cortisol. Pers Soc Psychol Bull 36(1):71–81.
27. Akaike H (1974) A new look at the statistical model identification. IEEE Trans Automat
Contr 19(6):716–723.
28. Gelman A, Jakulin A, Pittau MG, Su YS (2008) A weakly informative default prior
distribution for logistic and other regression models. Ann Appl Stat 2(4):1360–1383.
Taquet et al. PNAS | August 30, 2016 | vol. 113 | no. 35 | 9773
PS
YC
H
O
LO
G
IC
A
L
A
N
D
CO
G
N
IT
IV
E
SC
IE
N
CE
S
